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ОбложкаSchurz G. Philosophy of science: a unified approach. - New York; London: Routledge/Taylor & Francis, 2014. - xix, 456 p.: ill. - Bibliogr.: p.411-434. - Ind. of names: p.440-446. - Sub. ind.: p.447-456. - ISBN 978-0-415-82934-2
Шифр: (И/Ю25-S38) 02
 

Место хранения: 02 | Отделение ГПНТБ СО РАН | Новосибирск

Оглавление / Contents
 
List of Figures, Definitions and Key Propositions ............... x
List of Symbols ................................................ xv
Foreword ..................................................... xvii

1    Introduction: Where Do We Stand? ........................... 1
1.1  Tasks and Aims of Philosophy of Science .................... 1
1.2  On the Historical Development of Philosophy of Science ..... 3
1.3  Philosophical Positions in Contemporary Philosophy of
     Science .................................................... 5
     1.3.1  Logical Empiricism .................................. 5
     1.3.2  Critical Rationalism ................................ 7
     1.3.3  The Historical Account and Relativism ............... 8
     1.3.4  Metaphysical and Scientific Realism ................ 10
     1.3.5  Snapshots of Further Positions ..................... 12
1.4  Introductory Literature and Exercises ..................... 15

2    The Question of Unity: In Search of Common Foundations
     of the Sciences ........................................... 16
2.1  Normative or Descriptive? The Method of Rational
     Reconstruction ............................................ 16
2.2  Common Epistemological Assumptions ........................ 22
2.3  Common Methodological Features ............................ 25
2.4  Scientific Disciplines and Their Classification ........... 27
     2.4.1  The Special Status of Mathematical Sciences ........ 30
     2.4.2  Testing the Common Foundations of Science .......... 31
     2.4.3  Two Further Classifications of Sciences ............ 34
2.5  The Question of Value-Neutrality .......................... 37
     2.5.1  Max Weber's Value-Freedom Postulate and Its
            Critics ............................................ 37
     2.5.2  Value-Neutrality and Means-End Inferences .......... 39
     2.5.3  Explication of the Value-Neutrality Requirement .... 41
2.6  The Demarcation Problem and the Methodological Unity of
     Sciences .................................................. 44
     2.6.1  Demarcation ........................................ 44
     2.6.2  Methodological Unity Instead of Physical
            Reductionism ....................................... 46
2.7  Scientific Inference and Argumentation .................... 49
     2.7.1  Deduction and Induction ............................ 49
     2.7.2  Popper and the Significance of Inductive
            Inference in the Sciences .......................... 52
     2.7.3  Abduction and Inference to the Best Explanation .... 55
     2.7.4  Monotonic and Non-Monotonic Inferences ............. 58

Complementary and Advanced Topics
2.8  How Much Metaphysics is Presupposed byScience? ............ 59
     2.8.1 Truth, Idealism and Realism ......................... 59
     2.8.2 Constructive Realism versus Radical Constructivism .. 61
2.9  On the Theory (In)dependence of Observation ............... 63
     2.9.1  Theory-Dependency of Observation - Pros and Cons ... 65
     2.9.2  A Definition of Theory-Neutral Observation
            Concepts ........................................... 72
2.10 Value-Neutrality in the Context of Contemporary Debates ... 75
     2.10.1 The Role of Values in Science ...................... 75
     2.10.2 Value-Neutrality in the Context of Meta-Ethics ..... 77
     2.10.3 On the Difference between Sense Experiences and
            Value "Experiences" ................................ 78
2.11 The Justification of Induction: An Unsolvable Problem? .... 80
2.12 Introductory Literature and Exercises ..................... 85

3    The Conceptual Toolkit: Language, Logic and Probability ... 88
3.1  Kinds and Classification of Concepts ...................... 88
     3.1.1  The Logical Type of Concepts ....................... 88
     3.1.2  Formalization: Syntax and Semantics, Statements
            and Models ......................................... 92
     3.1.3  The Content Type of Concepts ....................... 96
     3.1.4  The Gradation (Scale) Type of Concepts ............. 99
3.2  Classification of Sentences According to Their Content
     Type ..................................................... 105
     3.2.1  Descriptive versus Prescriptive Sentences ......... 106
     3.2.2  Observation and Basic Sentences, Empirical and
            Theoretical Sentences ............................. 107
3.3  Logical Truth and Deductive Logic ........................ 110
3.4  Conventions of Meaning and Definitional Truths ........... 113
3.5  Classification of Sentences According to Their
     Generality ............................................... 117
3.6  General Sentences, Lawlikeness, Determinism and
     Indeterminism ............................................ 122
3.7  Content of Sentences and Kinds of Content ................ 126
3.8  Verification, Falsification, Confirmation and
     Disconfirmation .......................................... 128
3.9  Probability .............................................. 129
     3.9.1  Objective (Statistical) versus Epistemic
            (Subjective) Probability .......................... 129
     3.9.2  Mathematical Laws of Probability .................. 133

Complementary and Advanced Topics
3.10 Disposition Concepts ..................................... 135
3.11 Challenges to the Logical-Definitional-Synthetic
     Distinction .............................................. 140
3.12 Relevance and Irrelevance in Logical Inferences .......... 143
3.13 More on Probability ...................................... 147
     3.13.1 Construction of Probability Models and Sigma-
            Additivity ........................................ 147
     3.13.2 Binomial Distribution and Law of Large Numbers .... 150
     3.13.3 Problems of Objective-Statistical Probability
            Concepts .......................................... 152
     3.13.4 Problems of Subjective-Epistemic Probability
            Concepts .......................................... 158
     3.13.5 Connections between Objective and Epistemic
            Probabilities: a Dualist Account .................. 161
3.14 Introductory Literature and Exercises .................... 168

4    A Question of Fit: Law Hypotheses and Their Empirical
     Testing .................................................. 172
4.1  The Condition of Relevance ............................... 173
     4.1.1  Relevance of Strict Laws .......................... 173
     4.1.2  Relevance of Statistical Laws ..................... 176
4.2  Testing of Strict Law Hypotheses for Truth and
     Relevance ................................................ 181
     4.2.1  The Method of Agreement and Difference ............ 181
     4.2.2  Methodological Induction: How to Discover Strict
            Law Hypotheses .................................... 185
4.3  Testing Statistical Laws ................................. 188
     4.3.1  Testing for Likely Truth and Acceptance
            Intervals ......................................... 188
     4.3.2  Discovery of Statistical Hypotheses and
            Confidence Intervals .............................. 191
     4.3.3  Testing for Relevance and Significant
            Differences ....................................... 193
     4.3.4  Statistical Representativity ...................... 196
4.3.5 Test Statistics and Inference Statistics ................ 198
     4.3.6  Sources of Error in Statistical Methods ........... 200
     4.3.7  Applying Statistical Hypotheses to Individual
            Cases ............................................. 203
4.4  Correlation and Causality ................................ 204
     4.4.1  Hidden Variables .................................. 204
     4.4.2  Causal Direction .................................. 211

Complementary and Advanced Topics
4.5  Ceteris Paribus and Normic Laws .......................... 214
     4.5.1  Comparative versus Exclusive CP Laws .............. 214
     4.5.2  Normic Laws and Their Evolution-Theoretic
            Foundation ........................................ 219
4.6  Probability Distributions for Continuous Variables ....... 221
4.7  Bayesian Statistics ...................................... 226
     4.7.1  The Likelihood-Intuition: Objections and Replies .. 226
     4.7.2  The Bayesian Justification of the Likelihood-
            Intuition ......................................... 229
     4.7.3  Objective Bayesianism and the Principle of
            Indifference ...................................... 232
     4.7.4  Subjective Bayesianism and Convergence of
            Opinions .......................................... 235
4.8  Introductory Literature and Exercises .................... 238

5    Going Beyond Experience: Theories and Their Empirical
     Evaluation ............................................... 242
5.1  Theoretical Concepts and Multiple Laws of
     Correspondence ........................................... 242
5.2  The Example of Newtonian Physics ......................... 255
5.3  Theory Statics: The Structure of Scientific Theories ..... 263
     5.3.1  Components of Scientific Theories ................. 263
     5.3.2  Theory Nets and Intertheoretical Relations ........ 266
5.4  Methodological Features of (Good) Scientific Theories .... 268
     5.4.1  System Character: Holism of Meaning, Content,
            and Theory Testing (Duhem's Thesis) ............... 268
     5.4.2  Empirical Creativity, Global Unification, and
            Novel Predictions: Answers to Hempel's Dilemma .... 270
5.5  The Example of Piaget's Theory of Cognitive Development .. 272
5.6  Theory Dynamics .......................................... 278
     5.6.1  Lakatos' Model of Theory Revision ................. 278
     5.6.2  Theory Evaluation and Theory Progress ............. 281

Complementary and Advanced Topics
5.7  Instrumentalism and Realism: The Ontology of Scientific
     Theories ................................................. 291
     5.7.1  Versions of Instrumentalism and Realism ........... 291
     5.7.2  No Miracles Argument versus Pessimistic Meta-
            Induction ......................................... 294
     5.7.3  Empirical Underdetermination and Use-Novel
            Evidence .......................................... 295
     5.7.4  Intertheoretical Correspondence, Structural
            Realism and the Justification of Abduction ........ 296
5.8  The Ramsey Sentence of a Theory: (Non-) Eliminability
     of Theoretical Concepts .................................. 299
     5.8.1  Ramsey Sentence and Carnap Sentence ............... 299
     5.8.2  Instrumentalist Interpretation of the Ramsey
            Sentence .......................................... 301
     5.8.3  The Realist Interpretation of the Ramsey
            Sentence .......................................... 303
     5.8.4  Lewis Definitions ................................. 305
5.9  Criteria for Theoreticity and Empirical Significance ..... 307
     5.9.1  Pre-Theoretical and Theoretical Concepts .......... 307
     5.9.2  Empirical Significance ............................ 311

5.10 General Accounts of Confirmation ......................... 313
     5.10.1 Hypothetico-Deductive Confirmation ................ 314
     5.10.2 Bayesian Probabilistic Confirmation ............... 318
     5.10.3 Bayesian Pseudo-Confirmation through Content-
            Cutting ........................................... 320
     5.10.4 Latent Variables, Parameter Fitting and Use-Novel
            Evidence .......................................... 322
     5.10.5 Curve Fitting ..................................... 326
     5.10.6 Genuine Probabilistic Confirmation ................ 329
     5.10.7 Goodman's Paradox ................................. 331
     5.10.8 Confirmation and Acceptance ....................... 333
5.11 Non-Confirmational Accounts of Theory Evaluation ......... 336
     5.11.1 Truthlikeness ..................................... 336
     5.11.2 Unification, Coherence and Simplicity ............. 340
     5.11.3 The Problem of Language Dependence ................ 342
5.12 Introductory Literature and Exercises .................... 345

6    In Search of Causes: Explanation and All That Goes With
     It ....................................................... 348
6.1  The Deductive-Nomological Model of Explanation ........... 348
6.2  Explanation versus Prediction and Justification .......... 351
     6.2.1  Predictions without Explanatory Function .......... 352
     6.2.2  Causality and Lawlikeness ......................... 353
     6.2.3  Explanations without Predictive Function .......... 355
     6.2.4  Logical Problems of Irrelevance and Redundancy .... 356
6.3  Probabilistic Explanation Models ......................... 357
     6.3.1  Inductive-Statistical Explanation ................. 357
     6.3.2  Maximal Specificity ............................... 359
     6.3.3  Probabilistic and Causal Relevance Models ......... 361
     6.3.4  Conflicting Intuitions about the Height of
            Explanatory Probabilities ......................... 362
6.4  Normic Explanations and the Explanation of Human
     Actions .................................................. 365
6.5  Expectation, Causation and Unification: Explanation as
     a Prototype Concept ...................................... 367

Complementary and Advanced Topics
6.6  Lawlikeness .............................................. 370
     6.6.1  Laws of Nature versus System Laws ................. 371
     6.6.2  Lawlikeness in the Wide versus Narrow Sense ....... 372
     6.6.3  Lawlikeness i.w.s., Counterfactuals and
            Inductive Projectibility .......................... 373
     6.6.4  Spatiotemporal Universality and Maxwell's
            Condition ......................................... 375
     6.6.5  The Best System Account ........................... 377
     6.6.6  Physical Necessity and Independent Possibility
            Knowledge ......................................... 380
6.7  Causality ................................................ 382
     6.7.1  Singular and General Causality .................... 382
     6.7.2  Regularity Accounts ............................... 384
     6.7.3  Counterfactuals and Causal Powers ................. 385
     6.7.4  Causation and the Direction of Time ............... 386
     6.7.5  Causal Processes and Mechanisms ................... 387
     6.7.6  Interventionist Accounts .......................... 388
     6.7.7  Causality as a Theoretical Concept ................ 389
     6.7.8  Axioms of Causality: C-connection, Productivity
            and Faithfulness .................................. 395
     6.7.9  Causal Discovery .................................. 402
     6.7.10 Empirical Content of GTC .......................... 403
     6.7.11 From Variables to Events: Overdetermination and
            Causal Pre-emption ................................ 406
6.8 Introductory Literature and Exercises ..................... 407

Bibliography .................................................. 411
Solutions to Selected Exercises ............................... 435
Index of Names ................................................ 440
Index of Subjects ............................................. 447

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