Sher G. Epistemic friction: an essay on knowledge, truth, and logic (New York; Oxford, 2016). - ОГЛАВЛЕНИЕ / CONTENTS
Навигация
Архив выставки новых поступлений | Отечественные поступления | Иностранные поступления | Сиглы
ОбложкаSher G. Epistemic friction: an essay on knowledge, truth, and logic. - New York; Oxford: Oxford university press, 2016. - xviii, 370 p. - Bibliogr.: p.343-357. - Ind.: p.359-370. - ISBN 978-0-19-876868-5
Шифр: (И/Ю4-S53) 02
 

Место хранения: 02 | Отделение ГПНТБ СО РАН | Новосибирск

Оглавление / Contents
 
Acknowledgments .............................................. xvii

                    Part I. Epistemic Friction
1  Epistemic Friction and Freedom ............................... 3
   1.1  Epistemic Friction and its Roots in Kant, Wittgenstein,
        and McDowell ............................................ 4
   1.2  The Present Conception of Epistemic Friction ............ 8
   1.3  Epistemic Freedom ...................................... 12
   1.4  Between Friction and Freedom ........................... 16
2  A Sustainable Epistemic Methodology ......................... 17
   2.1  Epistemic Friction and the Illusion of
        Foundationalism ........................................ 17
   2.2  From Foundationalism to Foundational Holism ............ 20
   
               Part II. A Dynamic Model of Knowledge
3  Quine's Model of Knowledge: An Inner Tension ................ 39
   3.1  The Initial Promise of Quine's Model ................... 39
   3.2  An Inner Problem in Quine's Model ...................... 40
   3.3  Objections and Responses ............................... 43
   3.4  Dummett's Solution to the Inner Problem ................ 48
   3.5  A New Solution ......................................... 56
4  Dynamic Model—Two Dimensions of Change ...................... 62
   4.1  Contextual Dynamic ..................................... 62
   4.2  Temporal-Developmental Dynamic ......................... 68
5  Reality, Intellect, Realism ................................. 73
   5.1  The Basic Epistemic Situation .......................... 75
   5.2  Reality: Beyond Platonism and Nominalism ............... 77
   5.3  Intellect: Beyond Apriorism and Empiricism ............. 84
   5.4  Robust yet Non-Rigid Realism ........................... 91
6  Differences with Quine ..................................... 100
   6.1  Contrasts with Quine's Model .......................... 100
   6.2  Immunity to Criticisms of Quine's Model ............... 112
   
                  Part III. The Structure of Truth
7  A Substantivist Theory of Truth ............................ 131
   7.1  A Substantivist (as Opposed to Deflationist) 
        Methodology ........................................... 131
   7.2  The Unity and Disunity of Truth: Challenges and
        Strategies ............................................ 134
8  Basic Principles of Truth .................................. 162
   8.1  The Fundamental Principle of Truth .................... 162
   8.2  Ramifications for Skepticism .......................... 175
   8.3  The "Manifold" Correspondence Principle ............... 186
   8.4  Application to Mathematics (A New Theory of 
        Mathematical Truth) ................................... 192
   8.5  The Logicality Principle (Tarski's Theory of Truth
        in Perspective) ....................................... 218
   
           Part IV. An Outline of a Foundation for Logic

9  The Foundational Problem of Logic .......................... 239
   9.1  The Foundational Problem of Logic as 
        a Methodological Problem .............................. 239
   9.2  Analysis of the Problem and Alleged Remedies .......... 243
   9.3  Solution: The Foundational-Holistic Methodology ....... 250
10 An Outine of a Foundation for Logic ........................ 253
   10.1 What is Logic's Task in our System of Knowledge? ...... 254
   10.2 Is Logic Grounded in the Mind or in the World? ........ 255
   10.3 Why does Logic Require a Grounding in the World? ...... 260
   10.4 What Specific Features of the World is Logic
        Grounded in? - The Formality Thesis ................... 271
   10.5 From Formality to Generality, Necessity, Topic 
        Neutrality, Strong Normativity, Quasi-Apriority, and
        More .................................................. 288
   10.6 Source of the Normativity of Logic, Tarski's 
        Problem, Truth and Logical Truth, and Other Issues .... 294
   10.7 Questions and Objections: Logical Constants, 
        Invariance, Generality, and Necessity ................. 302
   10.8 Logic and Mathematics: An Alternative to Logicism ..... 320
   10.9 On the Possibility of Error and Revision in Logic ..... 327
   10.10 The Scope of Logic ................................... 331
   Conclusion: Toward Freedom ................................. 339
   
References .................................................... 343
Index ......................................................... 359

Архив выставки новых поступлений | Отечественные поступления | Иностранные поступления | Сиглы
 

[О библиотеке | Академгородок | Новости | Выставки | Ресурсы | Библиография | Партнеры | ИнфоЛоция | Поиск | English]
  Пожелания и письма: www@prometeus.nsc.ru
© 1997-2018 Отделение ГПНТБ СО РАН (Новосибирск)
Статистика доступов: архив | текущая статистика
 

Документ изменен: Thu Apr 5 17:11:40 2018. Размер: 8,277 bytes.
Посещение N 140 c 05.12.2017